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ABSTRACT
On the Internet today, account registration is nearly always
a requirement to interact with any website in a meaning-
ful way. Each digital identity a user creates is a new and
completely disjoint identity from all other existing digital
identities of the user. These traditional identities, Identity
1.0 identities, are site-centric and centralized. Alternatively,
Identity 2.0 identity solutions are completely decentralized
and user-centric.
This paper presents four different examples of user in-
teraction using Identity 2.0 based solutions that weren’t
possible within a traditional identity framework: greylist-
ing, identity multiplexing, user-centric privacy, and site pre-
registration. To understand the examples further, two ap-
plications using aspects of the examples provided were de-
veloped and deployed on the Internet for public use. More-
over, a third prototype was developed to further understand
how users interact within an Identity 2.0 based Internet.
Through the study of server logs and informal user studies,
two key observations were observed regarding general user
patterns of users authenticating themselves within a new
identity framework.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.2 [Information interfaces and presentation (e.g.,
HCI)]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Identity 2.0, OpenID, Yadis, Greylisting, Website Pre-
registration, User-Centric Privacy, Identity Multiplexing
Keywords
Identity management, privacy, user-centric technologies,
OpenID
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As a user browses from site to site on the Internet, the
user is nearly always required to create a new account on
each site if he or she would like to interact with a website in
any meaningful way. At a weblog, the desired user interac-
tion may be as simple as a comment to a posting; at a site
providing finical information, the interaction could be the
creation of a portfolio to manage their holdings; and at a
website managing a corporate project, the interaction may
be posting presentation slides or technical documents. If the
user created an account at each of these sites, he or she has
created a number of completely distinct user identities not
by a matter of choice but by matter of the requirement of
the site. As the number of sites the user has accounts on
increases, the probability that the user has used the same
username/password combination also increases, allowing a
malicious site to potentially interact with other (otherwise
trustworthy) sites because the malicious site has gained the
username/password combination through the user’s regis-
tration [24].
These traditional identities, which will be referred to in
this paper as Identity 1.0 identities, are centralized, site-
specific, and the privacy of the identity is only as good as
the privacy of the site storing the identity. Alternatively,
Identity 2.0 identities provide a decentralized, user-specific
means of authenticating an identity to a web service without
sharing any additional authentication information (such as
a password) to the site requesting the authentication of a
username other than the username itself. During the past
couple of years, a handful of Identity 2.0 identity solutions
have emerged from communities throughout the Internet [8,
10, 11, 17, 20, 21]. An overview of both cross-site (so called
”single sign-on”) Identity 1.0 solutions (such as the Mi-
crosoft .NET Passport [18]) and Identity 2.0 solutions (such
as OpenID [21]) will be provided in Section 2.
Having a user-centric digital identity framework, this pa-
per examines a number of interesting and different services
websites can provide using Identity 2.0 solutions that were
not feasible while using Identity 1.0 solutions. Examples of
this range from account pre-creation (a personalized expe-
rience is set up for a user even before the user has gone to
a website) to a user-centric privacy model (where the user
may choose to authenticate by means other than a pass-
word). These examples, along with others, are discussed in
Section 3.
To begin to understand how users interact with Identity
2.0 solutions, a number of the examples presented in Sec-
tion 3 were implemented in web-based solutions that were
released onto the Internet. On such example is the uN-
orron project (http://unorron.com/). As part of a third
party tool for a web-based MMOG called Norron [14], uN-
orron is an information management solution that allows
for members of kingdoms within the web-based game Nor-
ron. Through OpenID authentication, users playing Norron
are able to share in-game information with other kingdom
members without sharing a password with uNorron and,
also, without the threat of non-kingdom members access-
ing the information. The uNorron project is presented in
detail in Section 4.1 while another project, FBOpenID (al-
lows OpenID authentication through the Facebook API), is
presented in Section 4.2.
Through the development of Identity 2.0 based applica-
tions, a number of interesting characteristics were observed
by the users of the applications. One of the most significant
observations was the apparent concern over the security of
the OpenID authentication process, as a login to a site is no
longer a username and a password box but simply a user-
name box. Specifically, many users expressed concern and
confusion over how a single login box prevents someone from
logging in as their own identity. Section 5 presented this and
other user reactions to using OpenID in an uncontrolled, In-
ternet situation.
This goal of this paper isn’t to promote Identity 2.0 iden-
tities as an all around better identity solution than Identity
1.0 identities, but provide interesting usage and observations
over the use of Identity 2.0 identities in place of Identity 1.0
identities. In Section 6, this paper presents a vast discussion
of what we see as interesting projects using Identity 2.0 iden-
tities. Finally, this paper and the results found throughout
the paper are recapped in Seciton 7.
2. PREVIOUS WORK
As one of the most basic elements of being human, identity
and identity management have been thoroughly researched
across nearly all areas of research [2, 3, 9, 19]. Even the
concept of digital identity has been so critical to a multi-
tude of fields that there are numerous wide-ranging articles
exploring numerous aspects of digital identity [15]. Of all
of the previous work on the field of identity, this paper will
focus on the concept that has been established in recent lit-
erature known as single sign-on (SSO) [1, 22] in Section 2.1.
With the understanding of the vast collection of definitions
of what SSO has become to mean, Section 2.2 examines a
number of Identity 1.0-based solutions that have attempted
to achieve SSO in different regards. Finally, previous work
on Identity 2.0 identity solutions is presented alongside our
justification to use OpenID in our implementations.
2.1 Single Sign-On
The term Single Sign-On (SSO) has existing in literature
for over a decade [1] and has taken on a variety of meanings.
From the original works of having a single global login (sim-
ilar to the goals of the .NET framework), to a more realistic
view of having a unified session based login throughout a
series of services such as in CorSSO [15], SSO has nearly
always been about a single username and password to au-
thenticate in a cross-site means.
In the content of Identity 2.0, SSO has the same meaning
but reaches to a different end. Rather than attempting to
achieve an environment where a user would only have to
login once, Identity 2.0 provides for a single globally unique
identifier that allows the user to login at any site. That is,
on an Internet completely using Identity 2.0 technologies, a
user would need to login at every site, but he or she can log
in at every site with the same username via the exact same
process. This small but critical difference will be discussed
further in Section 2.3.
2.2 Identity 1.0
As discussed in the introduction of this paper, Identity
1.0 identity solutions can be seen all throughout the In-
ternet at nearly every webpage that allows any means of
meaningful user interaction. However, one Identity 1.0 solu-
tions is most notable due to its aim to achieve a global pro-
prietary identity scheme: Microsofts .NET Passport (now
called Windows Live ID). A number of publications has
looked at the risks and benefits of wide-scale adoption of
such a service [18], and Microsoft is pushing forward with
services such as CardSpace, a built-in component of Win-
dows Vista [7].
Several other players have also launched SSO products,
such as Novell, IBM, and others [25]. However, the target
markets of these SSO products are at an enterprise level
and not at an Internet level. Moreover, their requirements
of a centralized server in these products also make these
products site-centric rather than user-centric as an Identity
2.0 solutions is required to be.
2.3 Identity 2.0
In our final section for analysis of the existing work, we
will examine a number of different glasswork efforts that
have lead to a growing number of Identity 2.0 identity so-
lutions. One of the first solutions, sxip [8], was a single
sign-on Identity 2.0 solution built by Sxip Identity Corpo-
ration. Having gone through two versions, sxip has recently
merged with OpenID in an attempt to unify the Identity 2.0
framework.
Similar to sxip, a technology that was universally known
by the acronym LID for Light-Weight Identity was devel-
oped by a bottom-up effort to create a simple but powerful
technology that empowers individuals to keep control over
and manage their on-line digital identities [10]. In the Sum-
mer of 2005, Brad Fitzpatrick (the creator of OpenID) and
key players from the company behind LID, NetMesh, met
together and created a new framework for digital interoper-
able identity management: Yadis [17].
In the simplest terms, Yadis is self-proclaimed as ”The
Identity and Accountability Foundation for Web 2.0”. Yadis
provides a framework to specify different authentication
mechanisms - be it OpenID, LID, or inames. Moreover,
since Yadis is completely XML based, Yadis will be able to
expand for to encapsulate future technologies if necessary.
One of the critical technologies in Yadis is the technol-
ogy of OpenID [20]. Developed by Brad Fitzpatrick in July
2005, OpenID uses a URL as a globally unique public identi-
fier for a user. Due to the adoption of OpenID by Livejour-
nal, Movable Type, and others, OpenID is the most widely
adopted Identity 2.0 technology. A previous paper explains
the technical details of OpenID [21], while a simple overview
is provided for readers of this paper in Seciton 3.3.
3. SERVICES USING IDENTITY 2.0
In the years and years of studies over identity manage-
ment, vast reaching ideas have been studied on how to
Figure 1: A diagram showing the possiblities of an identity multiplexer using any Identity 1.0 identity with
a supporting API to log into any one of the many existing Identity 2.0 solutions.
streamline a user’s experience through multiple websites. As
discussed in the previous section, a vast majority of this lit-
erature has focused on a centralized server and applications
ran within a framework mandated by that central server.
However, with the growing adoption of Identity 2.0 identi-
ties, many of these ideas can be revisited, expanded upon,
and extended to fit within a cross-site user-centric frame-
work allowing for the user to have complete control over his
or her identity. This section presents a collection of just
a few of the technological advances in identity management
that could be seen with the wide-spread adoption of Identity
2.0 identity solutions.
As one of the most pressing issues on the Internet today,
the ever increasing presence of spam will be the focus of
the first service examined in this section. This service, the
concept of greylisting [12], when applied with Identity 2.0
identities allows for a site to both whitelist a username to
allow him or her to interact with the site without needing to
know anything more than the user’s username and blacklist
an IP or other address of a known spammer.
Following greylisting, we go on to present the idea of iden-
tity multiplexing in Section 3.2, where multiple Identity 1.0
solutions may be tied with multiple Identity 2.0 solutions
at a single website. To examine the practicality of the idea,
we present a small-scale Internet-based identity multiplexing
implementation in Section 4.2.
Since the concept of privacy goes hand and hand with the
concept of identity, Section 3.3 presents how different imple-
mentations of Identity 2.0 authentication schemes allows for
a user to choose exactly how much security and privacy a
user desires with each of his or her identities. Finally, since
identities can be shared from site to site without the need
to share private information such as passwords, sites using
Identity 2.0 identity solutions can ”pre-register” a user so
that when the user visits this new site, the new site is al-
ready pre-customized for the user.
3.1 Greylisting
Throughout the Internet, the existence of spam has be-
come so prevalent that sites will go to any length to prevent
and eliminate spam [12]. Moreover, the research commu-
nity is constantly proposing spam-mitigating technologies
attempting to stop the spammer in their tracks [12]. How-
ever, current technologies of attempting to detect a spam-
mer has generally failed or has been broken within just a
matter of days [12] (for example, Human Interactive Proofs
(HIPs) / CAPTICAs attempt to prevent a spammer from
registering, but recent research suggest that computers can
out perform humans on even the best generated HIPS [6]).
To that end, there has been recent work on a new concept
called ”greylisting”.
The basic idea behind greylisting is to combine the best
aspects of both whitelisting and blacklisting. Currently, the
term ”greylisting” has been only used in the context of e-
mail by exploiting the SNTP protocol to require the sender
of the e-mail to send the e-mail twice before it is received
by the user [12]. However, with the creation of a globally
unique non-private user identifier, user names can now be
shared on a whitelist allowing for a site to instantly trust an
otherwise unknown user.
Unlike traditional whitelists that attempt to collect a list
of trusted sites, greylisting in Identity 2.0 solutions bene-
fit most from implementing a specific type of whitelists: a
social whitelist. Introduced in literature in the content of
e-mails, Garriss et al [12] presented the whitelisting in a
friend-of-a-friend [5] content. Rather than replying on e-
mail, Identity 2.0 supporting applications may collect a list
of users it currently trusts and publish that list of users for
other Identity 2.0 supporting applications to consume and
use to the benefit of the application.
In the content of a blog, this social whitelist could be sim-
ply a list of users who have left at least five significant, non-
spam comments. Clearly, this metric doesn’t need to be con-
crete and may be site-specific - a corporation may whitelist
all users who have an OpenID derived from their domain
name (such as http://*.openid.net/). In fact, as of the pub-
lication of this paper, one website has already published a
social whitelist for other applications to consume [23]. That
author of the website, Simon Willison, advocates a system
where human interaction would be required before a blog
comment would appear if the user doesn’t appear on his
social whitelist.
While social whitelisting alone is a step toward reducing
spam, the years of work in blacklisting has proven to slow the
work of spammers in numerous instances [12]. To that end,
we propose combining the works of both whitelisting and
blacklisting into a nbew type of greylisting. In a greylisting
system, a user would be allowed to interact without restric-
tion if he or she is on the whitelist, a user would be able to
interact with limited restriction is he or she is on nether the
whitelist or blacklist, and a user on the blacklist would be
able to interact with only strictly limited restrictions. That
way, a level of user trust is introduced into the system, al-
lows for ”good” users to interact freely, and also allows for
a blacklisted user to move toward being removed from the
blacklist rather than simply being banned from a site or
application.
Moving beyond greylisting, the next section presents the
concept of identity multiplexing alongside an application
that moves toward allowing for identity multiplexing.
3.2 Identity Multiplexing
Much like Identity 1.0 solutions, there are a number of
different Identity 2.0 solutions available for both users and
developers. Many of theses solutions were presented in Sec-
tion 2.3, where each Identity 2.0 solution exhibited some
similar characteristics but were largely incompatible with
each other. To overcome the user confusion of multiple com-
peting protocols, we present the idea of identity multiplex-
ing.
A site or application that provides for identity multi-
plexing is simply a site or application that allows for lo-
gin via multiple Identity 1.0 providers to a single account
that can be verified by multiple Identity 2.0 protocols. For
example, a user may be able to log into a website, id-
mux.com, through his or her Facebook login, his or her
Google login, his or her Yahoo! Login, or any other Iden-
tity 1.0 login service that supports cross-site authentication
via some publicly available API. After creating some user-
name, such as ”amy.idmux.com”, that user may not validate
”amy.idmux.com” through any supported Identity 2.0 pro-
tocol. Figure 1 presents a visual description of the identity
multiplexing process.
To begin to understand how users will interact with this
idea, we implemented a working small-scale identity multi-
plexer for multiplexing a Facebook login with both OpenID
and Yadis. The implementation, FBOpenID, is discussed in
detail in Section 4.2.
3.3 User-Centric Privacy
As users take increasing control of their identity, the is-
sue of privacy is also passed onto the user. In the OpenID
protocol, a user logs into an OpenID-supporting site with a
”claimed identity”. The OpenID-supporting site then veri-
fies the claimed identity with the user’s ”homesite”, the web
site that is tasked to prove that the identity belongs to the
user. At the homesite, it is up to the user (if the user created
his or her own homesite) or the provider of the homesite (if
the user uses an Identity 2.0 provider) to authenticate the
user by any means. Traditionally, this has been done with
just a password. For example, FBOpenID (introduced in
the previous section), uses a user’s Facebook login to au-
thenticate their Identity 2.0 identity. However, passwords
have historically been easily phished [24] and rely on a user
being extremely observant.
Since Identity 2.0 solutions no long rely on a centralized
server for identification, each individual site can exploit site-
specific resources for the authentication of users. For exam-
ple, a corporation may set up an Identity 2.0 homesite that
only allows for authentication of the identity when the re-
quest comes from within the company firewall. Likewise, a
user may choose to only allow for authentication when his
or her IP address is some specific IP address or within a spe-
cific range of IP addresses. The possibilities of user-centric
privacy models are endless and rely only upon the user’s
imagination and implementation of such privacy models.
In evaluating one of these examples further, we created a
prototype of an IP address regulated authentication system
where a user would have to provide strong credentials to lo-
gin when he or she accesses his or her homesite from outside
his or her university’s IP address range. Otherwise, when
accessing his or her homesite form with the range, the user
would only have to provide weak credentials. The system,
MeIdentity, is explained in detail within the implementation
section of this paper in Section 4.3.
3.4 Cross-site Pre-Registration
Having discussed greylisting, identity multiplexing, user-
defined and user-centric privacy models, we move on to dis-
cuss our final service that can vastly improve the user expe-
rience on the web. Using the characteristic of Identity 2.0
identity solutions discussed earlier of a globally unique pub-
lic username that can be shared without any information
other than the username, the ability to pre-register a user
to a specific website based on his or her preferences or us-
age of another website is now feasible. The only limitation
of this cross-site service would be the availability of public
information. That is, preferences that a user sees on some
website only when logged in and is only manifested in that
user’s session could, obviously, not be read by another web-
site that is otherwise completely disjoint from the original
site.
Imagine a world where each comment you make on a blog
post already knew what formatting tags you preferred to
use, already knew what screen name you preferred to use,
and more. By extending this further, frameworks could be
developed to transfer data between two different sites about
a user without needing to exchange any personal informa-
tion about the user themselves. For example, if a user posted
a large percentage of his or her posts in the anthropology
section of a site’s forum, a site may wish to customize their
interface for that user to reflect their anthropological inter-
ests.
As more and more sites use Identity 2.0 identity solutions,
we believe it will be clear that cross-site profile gathering will
be a critical field of study. We discuss possibly projects to
realize these effects in our Future Works section.
4. IMPLEMENTATIONS USING OPENID
Throughout all of Section 3, we discussed a number of
different and interesting uses of identities under the new
context of identity management available with Identity 2.0
identity solutions. Throughout that section, we referenced a
number of projects that we have prototyped and, in all but
one case, completed a full implementation that was deployed
on the Internet for public use. In each of these implemen-
tations, the Identity 2.0 solution used was OpenID as it has
become the most prevalent Identity 2.0 solution available on
the Internet. Moreover, FBOpenID, the implementation to
study identity multiplexing, also used Yadis to examine the
benefits of identity multiplexing.
The first of the three projects presented is an infor-
mation manager for an online massively multiplayer game
by Nathaniel Johnston entitled Norron [14]. A complete
description of our information manager implementation is
available in Seciton 4.1. The next project, introduced in
Section 3.2 and earlier in this introduction of implementa-
tions, FBOpenID, implements a small-scale identity multi-
plexer that allows users to use their Facebook login as the
authentication mechanism to their Identity 2.0 identity. Fi-
nally, MeIdentity, examines user-centric security models and
is discussed in Seciton 4.3.
4.1 uNorron
Figure 2: Screen shot of uNorron
(http://unorron.com/), as seen by a user if ar-
riving at uNorron for the first time.
Launched in late 2006, the massively multiplayer game
(MMOG) Norron is a web-based strategy game that or-
ganizes players within fifty different kingdoms on a world
map. Within Norron, each kingdom has a common commu-
nication area (an ”assembly”) that allows for the exchange
of information but provides only basic forum functionali-
ties. Therefore, the sharing of information between players
within a kingdom is unnecessarily difficult given only the
available resources in-game. Moreover, information is pre-
sented in-game as raw numbers (such as numbers of troops
and buildings) rather than their actual values as the effect
gameplay (such as offensive power and defensive power).
Figure 3: The orignal OpenID login box in uNorron.
Seeing the need for a more efficient means of communi-
cations, uNorron (http://uNorron.com/) was created as an
information manager for Norron. The uNorron application
is a completely web-based interface consisting of three main
parts: the formatter, the attack calculator, and the quest in-
dex. The formatter allows for users to copy and paste their
web browser from the Norron game into uNorron and the
information is formatted for them in a meaningful way and
stored on the uNorron server. Once information is imported
into the uNorron formatter, users can choose a player to
run the attack calculator on. The attack calculator calcu-
lates the results of an attack if the player chooses to attack
the chosen target. Finally, the quest index simply outlines
the tree of available quests to players. The quest index was
added as an attraction to users of the site, and is not a part
of the site particularly interesting to the study of OpenID.
Figure 4: The improved OpenID login box in uNor-
ron. The addition of a text to explain the OpenID
process increased usage by over four fold.
Users may use the uNorron site without logging and will
be able to store information about one target at a time.
However, if a user logs in, the user then is able to store in-
formation about any number of targets. Moreover, a logged
in user may associate themselves with a kingdom and share
the target information with all users within a kingdom. To
log in, a user simply logs in via OpenID though a textbox
provided on the top-right corner of every uNorron page.
The initial design on the OpenID login box was a simple
box that showed the text ”Login via OpenID:” and pro-
vided an OpenID text box and a login button, as shown
in Figure 3. Through analysis of the server logs, only two
users (<3% of total unique IP addresses) successfully logged
in through OpenID despite the added benefits. More sur-
prisingly, six other users tried using what appeared to be a
username in the OpenID box.
To counter the misinformed usage of OpenID, we modi-
fied the uNorron website with the text ”Don’t know what
OpenID is? You probably already have one. Read More!”.
This modified login area can been seen in Figure 4. The
”Read More” link directed users to a page explaining
OpenID and linked them to OpenID identity providers.
Within seven days, server logs indicate that successful lo-
gins via OpenID increased over four fold (11.7% of total
unique IP addresses).
The uNorron project is an on going project that continues
to expand in popularity as the world spreads within the
Norron game about uNorron. In Section 5, we discuss the
lessons learned by the uNorron application as well as the
lessoned learned by the other implementations discussed in
the next two sections.
4.2 FBOpenID
Introduced in Section 3.2, the concept of identity mul-
tiplexing allows for users to use any number of traditional
Identity 1.0 identities as a means of authenticating any num-
ber of their Identity 2.0 identities that are supported by the
site. To that end, FBOpenID (http://fbopenid.com/) was
created to analyze user feedback and user reaction to a web
service providing this type of identity multiplexing.
Specifically, FBOpenID provides users with the abil-
ity to login to their Facebook login through the Face-
book API [13]. Once FBOpenID receives a positive
Figure 5: Screen shot of FBOpenID
(http://fbopenid.com/), as seen by a user if
arriving at FBOpenID for the first time.
assertion of the user’s Facebook identity, the user is
able to choose a subdomain of FBOpenID to be his or
her identity. For example, the user Amy Smith could
choose: ”amy.fbopenid.com”, ”amy.smith.fbopenid.com”,
”gradschooler.fbopenid.com”, or any other subdomain that
hasn’t been used by another user. Once the user has his or
her subdomain, they may begin using it as either a login to
sites supporting OpenID or to sites supporting Yadis.
Taking the lessons learned from uNorron, FBOpenID pro-
vided an explanation of both how the Facebook API will be
securely authenticating their identity to us as well as how
OpenID/Yadis will then allow them to securely log into any
OpenID or Yadis-supporting site. Figure 5 shows a screen-
shot of the page a user would see upon visiting FBOpenID,
with a description of the technology along site a login area
in the top right corner of the context area.
Through informal user studies with fourteen users, where
users were each given the link to FBOpenID and asked to
play around with it and use it as they wish and could pro-
vide any feedback, the greatest concern of the users was
the privacy of their identity. In fact, nearly half (six of
fourteen users) raised concerns asking simular to: ”how
does an OpenID site know that someone else didn’t type
amy.fbopenid.com as my OpenID and login as me?” To at-
tempt to counteract this fear, the addition of user-accessible
logs showing all usage of their OpenID was provided for a
user when they log in.
Based on another user’s suggestion, this log was further
modified to provide an always-visible ”last used” status field
on every page on FBOpenID when the user is logged in
to show the user when he or she lasted used his or her
FBOpenID. While not directly providing a more technical
definition of the security of OpenID and Yadis, this was
enough to have all but one of the six users to remark that
this addition addressed their concern. We present a dis-
cussion on this and the other implementation projects with
regard to the lessons we learned in Section 5.
4.3 MeIdentity
In our last of three projects, MeIdentity
(http://meidentity.com/) presents a user-centric model
of privacy designed for university or university-like setting.
Unlike the previous implementations that were available
for anyone to access on the Internet, MeIdentity was a
prototype and was not able to interact with our university’s
authentication system to authenticate an OpenID based
upon a student’s university login. Instead, this prototype
shows the ability to have differing levels of privacy based
upon user locality and user preference.
Specifically, there are three different levels of security and
identity privacy:
• User is on his or her personal IP address: The user
needs only to provide a weak verification of identity (a
short pin-number like number).
• User is on within his or her campus’ IP address range:
The user needs to provide a strong verification of iden-
tity (such as the student’s university login).
• User is not within his or her campus’ IP address range:
The user needs to provide a strong verification of iden-
tity followed by a weak verification of identity.
Each of these levels of privacy are shown in Figure 6.
Moreover, each user may choose to require a greater degree
of authentication security at each level. For example, a user
who’s using his or her own IP address may know that they
share their computer with a number of their friends com-
monly. Therefore, that user can choose to require a strong
verification upon login even if they are on their own personal
computer.
Of the fourteen users who viewed FBOpenID, twelve of
them then viewed the MeIdentity prototype. Remarkably,
every single user said they preferred this locality based au-
thentication system over the authentication through Face-
book. From this, we believe that as we filter more privacy
control down to the user, we believe the user trusts the iden-
tity mechanism more and more. In the next section, we re-
view the lessons we’ve learned through the three different
implementations discussed in this and previous sections.
5. LESSONS LEARNED
In reviewing previous work, we found that the additional
of single sign-on technologies has eased the authentication
burden of the user and has been widely seen as a technology
widely accepted by users. Specifically, we were unable to
find anywhere that users were concerned about the security
of their identity in cross-site authentication systems (such
as when the .NET framework was used at third-party sites
when Microsoft launched their single identity initiative). In-
stead, the greatest concern to users was reported to be the
privacy of their information again and again.
With Identity 2.0 identity solutions being completely de-
centralized, a user can set up his or her own homesite and
therefore control every aspect of the information his or her
identity shares. By that inherit property, we thought that
OpenID-based systems would show us results where users
would have their individual concerns about specific aspects,
but we didn’t expect a strong overwhelming trend on a com-
pletely different issue. However, we found that users over-
whelmingly were unsure of authentication schemes where
the only information they provide to a site is a username.
Show in Figure 3 and Figure 4, an OpenID login box
requests for the user to provide only a single piece of in-
formation to login. This process was counterintuitive to
Figure 6: Three screen shots of the MeIdentity prototype in order of decreasing security. The first image
(leftmost) shows a user coming from his or her personal IP address and needs only to provide their MeIdentity
code. The next image (center) shows a user coming from within her trusted network (such as a university’s
IP range); this user would need only to provide their MeIdentity password. The last image (rightmost) shows
a user coming from an untrusted network and was prompted to enter both his or her MeIdentity password
and MeIdentity code. To prevent possible attacks from gathering any information, only minimal information
about what is going on is provided to the user.
most users when they first saw the OpenID login box and,
in uNorron, more users tried entering a username in the
OpenID login box rather than a URL as an OpenID login
box requires. It appears as though users are so used to log-
ging in with both a username and a password that they are
concerned for their privacy when they don’t give a pass-
word to site. Therefore, we quickly learned that it is critical
that, when a user is presented with authentication requir-
ing anything less than a username and a password, a user is
provided with a detailed description of how the technology
works and how it ensures that someone can’t type the same
username and receive access to the user’s information.
Going hand and hand with providing a description of tech-
nology to the user, we also found that users feel more secure
with a technology when they are able to control the privacy
of the technology. Existing literature suggests that privacy
increases uses trust, but the correspondence seen between
privacy and user’s trust in applications of identity appears,
based on initial results, to have a significantly stronger corre-
lation. We assert that there’s nothing more crucial to a user
that his or her identity, and that a user would demand the
most privacy controls with regard to his or her identity than
nearly any other application. We back this assertion up with
cases such as Facebook’s introduction of the ”News Feed”,
where media reports ran ramped with stories on users con-
cerns over their privacy as all their actions were available for
everyone to read and there were no privacy setting to limit
the display of such information [16].
Therefore, we assert that there are two characteristics of
user interaction discovered and supported by the work in
this paper:
• Login Security is Crucial: Users generally feel insecure
when they provide only a username to a site as a login
credential. Any early adoption Identity 2.0 support-
ing technology will have to be sure to explain to end
users how their information is secure and protected
even though they appear to only provide a publicly
available username.
• Privacy Controls with Identity are Strongly Favored:
Users overwhelmingly favored a system where they
were given the ability to control their privacy based
on levels of access. We assert that while users gener-
ally appreciate privacy, this appreciation is strongest
when it comes to the privacy of their very identity.
6. FUTURE WORK
The work is this paper is only the very beginning works
toward understanding how users interact with Identity 2.0
identity solutions and what users will come to expect from
identity management in the future. This paper presented an
array of uses for identity technologies that provide for the a
seamless user experience, but these technologies only touch
the very tip of the iceberg of what’s possibly with Identity
2.0 identity solutions.
In our work, we plan to continue the three projects
presented in this paper: uNorron (http://unorron.com/),
FBOpenID (http://fbopenid.com/), and MeIdentity
(http://meidentity.com/). By introducing new features into
uNorron slowly, we hope to understand if there becomes
a point where a large amount of users choose that it’s
worthwhile to login using OpenID to receive additional
features. Specifically, we’re interested in seeing if there
exists a well defined point between ”very few users log in”
to ”very few users don’t log in” - a bimodal distribution [4].
If such a point exists, it would provide valuable insight in
what amount of content a sight ought to provide for a user
to feel it’s worthwhile to make their presence known if there
are no other requirements (such as giving out an e-mail
address, payment, or any other form of commitment).
We believe that coupling Identity 2.0 solutions with exist-
ing services could provide a new, richer experience for the
user. For example, since Identity 2.0 identities are com-
pletely public, a user may wish to have disjoint identities
while browsing on different parts of the Internet but have
a site compile information for them about their combined
identity. Many of these works begin to examine how the In-
ternet might look with a wide-spread adoption of an Identity
2.0 solution.
Overall, we strongly believe that this field will be a
field opening up to a large amount of industry-based and
academic-based research. With the foundations already be-
ginning to be seen of an Internet-wide Identity 2.0 solution
in OpenID, we expect this to only spur the development of
Identity 2.0 supporting applications able to make use of this
interesting field of research.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we began with the observation that nearly
every site on the Internet requires a user to create ”yet an-
other identity” to make use of any meaningful customization
on a given website. With users often using the same user-
name and password combination to a number of the sites
they’ve registered on, we found traditional identities to be
insecure and site-centric rather than user-centric. These tra-
ditional identities, Identity 1.0 identity solutions, have dom-
inated the Internet and have made it so that users expect
to be required to provide both a username and a password
to login to a site.
In contrast, Identity 2.0 identity solutions provide a de-
centralized user-centric model of identity that allows the
user to control where he or she will store his or her own
identity and the privacy policies behind it. In Section 3,
we examine four interesting uses of Identity 2.0 identities
that wasn’t available using a traditional Identity 1.0 solu-
tion: greylisting, cross-site pre-registration, identity multi-
plexing, and user-centric privacy models. To understand
many of these examples further, we developed two com-
pletely implementations that were deployed on the Internet
for anyone to use: FBOpenID (http://fbopenid.com/) and
uNorron (http://unorron.com). Moreover, a third applica-
tion was developed as a prototype to understand user-centric
privacy models: MeIdentity (http://meidentity.com/).
After examining server logs and informal user studies,
we found two strong underlying trends in user’s usage of
Identity-based solutions: that users expect to provide a user-
name and password to a site and that a user appreciates
privacy when it comes to identity more so than a user ap-
preciates privacy in other aspect of computer applications.
To counter a user’s concern about security and privacy when
entering only a username to authenticate to a site, we found
a detailed description of how their privacy and security is
ensured appears to dampen a user’s concern about their pri-
vacy and security. This was done as simply as adding a link
to ”Learn More” about OpenID below the OpenID login
box.
Reflecting on what we found through our works, we briefly
discuss our intentions to continue the projects introduced in
this paper and discuss how we foresee research in Identity
2.0 based solutions will be an interesting and expanding area
of research in the coming years. We strongly believe that
Identity 2.0 solutions will make the Internet a more secure
environment and allow users to control their identifies with
a much greater degree of privacy, a desire that is reflected
by a large number of users.
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